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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~1AH

DEPARTMENT OF
AT I ml,

IRl'.l'ISF• JR I

Respondent,
'/S.

SUPREME COURT NO.

J0Hll D'AMBROSIO, MABLE
U'AMBROSIO, his wife,
JOSEPH CHA and MARION
CHA, his wife,

19271

Appellants.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the trial court,
"f.R,"

refers to Transcript of Record,

"R." refers to Record, and

"Ex." refers to Exhibit.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter involves two eminent domain cases which were
consolidated for trial and involving parcels of real property
situate in Carbon County, State of Utah.

The jurisdictional

issues relative to the right of the Plaintiff to condemn were not
contested, and the matters proceeded for trial based upon the
statutory issue of just compensation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter came on for trial before the Court with a jury
,,n

thP

0

,th day of April, 1983, before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell,

Gcslr let Court Judge, which trial was scheduled following a series

-2-

of hearings and rulings on various Motions.
Based upon prior rulings of the trial rourt,
posture of the pleadings,

the parties entered uilu

'I

the commencement of the trial to settle the issue of ,J,,,,,,J,
the value of the parcel "taken in fee",
as an issue on appeal,

(Parcel

69:A), b1J':

the Court's Orders and rulings •c1livc

J·

the defendant landowners to seek a determination of severarn
damages sustained by their respective remaining tracts b; Jur·.
trial.

(R.

61-64,

74-75,

107-108,

110-111,

Pursuant to said Stipulation,
value of the land taken,

(R.

126; T.R.

76-52

Judgment was enterFa fee·

121-123),

and the defendant landci.:·

thereafter instituted this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask that the Orders and rulings of the tr
court,

denying them from asserting their claims for severance

damages, be reversed and that the matter be remanded for

JUG

on said issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff,
instituted five ( 5)
Carbon County,

Utah,

Utah Department of Transportation,

separate actions in the District Court nf
Civil Nos.

11211,

11212,

11213, 11214,

11215, pertaining to various parcels of land located in tloe
southeast quadrant

of Price,

the "D'Ambrosio properties".

Utah,
(R.

and generally referred tc
1 , 39.-46; T. R.

The purpose of such actions was to acquire lancJs

i "

1

construction and maintenance of a new bypass highway f~c:dili

-3-

1

l111~t r'11cted

in and near Price,

Utah.

(R.

1, 39-46; T.R.

3-7;

[J- l ) .

[ '

Common to each case was a small strip of land which

'"'"r
'"

ttuLed a private access and right-of-way leading to and from

r •

0

Spective parcels of the various defendant landowners to the

publlc highway located northerly therefrom, and which was condemned
Plaintiff as part of the lands being acquired for highway

u'} the>

j~velopment.

This particular parcel is identified throughout the

?ar1uus cases as "Parcel No. 028-2:69:A", and sometimes referred to
as

"Parcel 69:A", comprising approximately 0.10 acres, more or

less.

( R.

74-75; Ex. D-1).

By Order of the trial court, Civil Actions 11213 and 11214
,1ere consolidated for trial,

(R. 74-75), and it is these cases

are the subJect of this appeal.

~h1ch

The trial court ruled that

tl1e defendant landowners, John D'Ambrosio, Mable D'Ambrosio, his
Joseph Cha, and Marion Cha, his wife, were not, as a matter

•1fe,

of law,

entitled to assert a claim for severance damages to their

respective private residential premises.
!U8,

110-111; T.R.

(R.

61-64, 74-75, 107-

55-57).

It is this ruling and Order that the Defendants object to
3nd ask

that this Court reverse same, and order a trial on the

issue of severance damages.

The parcel of land which forms the focal point of this
3ppea 1 ,

(Pa reel 69: A) , is but a part of a total tract which has

historically been owned, used, and occupied by the "D'Ambrosio
fornily"

of Price, Utah, as a private right-of-way and access to

"f1Ptr respective tracts of land.
80-'J8;

Ex. D-1)

(R.

1-9, 36-46, 52-57, 65-69,

.,..
-4-

I

It is generally undisputed and acknowledged, as evid"r.
by the pleadings,

exhibits,

and transcript,

and Mable D'Ambrosia, husband and wife,

that John

own and occupy

residential lot upon which they have constructed their
residence,

D'Amh~:

fa~ •.

located at the most southerly end of "Parcel 69:r,"

contiguous to the easterly line of said parcel,

and that

Sd\e

"Parcel 69 :A" has been and does in fact constitute the sole
established access from the public highway leading to their r_,,_
fronting on said "Parcel 69:A".

( R.

1-9' 36-46' 52-57'

65-~:

The Defendants Joseph Cha and Marion Cha are husban<J ,,., I
wife, and own in fee simple a private residential lot adiacer.t ·
the north boundary of the residential lot owned and occupied r
John D'Ambrosia and Mable D'Ambrosia, his wife,
has been constructed their family residence,

upon which the"

and which

11kew1~

fronts on and is contiguous to the east line of "Parcel 69:A",
which parcel affords the sole and only established access

le~·

from their home to the public highway located northerly therefc ·
Marion Cha and John D 'Ambrosio are brother and sister,
with the exception of their spouses,
Civil Actions, Nos.

11213 and 11214,

the other named Defend•~'
are children of a deceased

brother of the Defendants John D 'Ambrosio and Marion Cha.

The

other named Defendants owned an additional residential tract
contiguous to and immediately north of the Cha property, v1h 1 cl
1 ikewi se fronted upon "Paree 1 69: A" , al though the northerly l''i·
that parcel was contiguous to a county road running in an ease
direction.

This particular parcel, however, was acquired l•Y

Plaintiff in separate condemnation proceedings for highway
construction and development.

-5-

The subiect property (Parcel 69:A) had for more than 25
r

''"-'nty-f1ve) years been utilized by the Defendants and the

''U'Ambros10 family'' as a right-of-way for ingress and egress to the
f'i'I

r r,0 Ls

'o2-':;7,

of 1 and which each of the parties own.

(R.

1-9, 36-46,

6'i-69, 80-98)
Based upon an examination of the title thereto, the

nvmership of "Parcel 69:A" was, at the date of condemnation, vested
1n

fee simple as follows:

D'Ambrosia;

88.92% undivided interest in John

11.08% undivided interest or 2.77% each by Domenic

U'Ambrosio, Paul D'Ambrosia, Sharon D'Ambrosia, and Frances
D'Ambrosia; subject, however, to an easement and right-of-way in
favor of all of the named Defendants for ingress and egress to
their respective properties.

(R.

80-98).

In Civil Actions, Nos. 11213 and 11214, the Plaintiff
recognizes and alleges the Defendants are either "record owners" or
"parties in interest" of "Parcel 69 :A",

(R.

80-98)

, and does not dispute the fact that the "Parcel 69:A"
constituted the established method and source of ingress and egress
to the resepctive parcels of land belonging to the Defendants over
a long period of time.

(R.

1-9, 23, 39-42)

Based upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
Plaintiff,

the Court, by Order on August 31, 1981, ruled that the

Defendants, Joseph Cha and Marion Cha, his wife, and John D'Ambrosia
anrl Mable D'Ambrosia, his wife, were not entitled to any
compensation for severance damages to their respective residential
p1operties owned in fee simple, as any such damages would be
•consequential in nature, and therefore, not subject to compensation.
IH

'JO-'il, 74-75)

-6-

Upon further hearing and argument,
prior ruling by Order dated November 3,

the Court reaff;,,.

1981,

there1n

~Gnc·J

and ordering that said Defendants were not ent1tled to
severance damages,
fractional

notwithstanding the fact that

tiH·

interests or established rights-of-way

~1th

that the Court accepted factually the conditions of

ovmer~r

asserted by the Defendants John D'Ambrosio and Mable D'Amhi•,•
(R.

107-108).

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS IBLE ERROR IN RULlliC ·
THE DEFENDANTS JOHN D 'AMBROSIO, AND MABL£D'AMBROSICJ;'-ITT~
JOSEPH CHA AND MARION CHA, HIS WIFE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, ARE
PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING A CLAIM FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES rn IITT:
RESPECTIVE PRIVATELY OWNED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES.
ARGUMENT
The subject actions involve the condemnation and
expropriation of a private and exclusive right-of-way ovmej /
used in common by the Defendants, which constituted the estat.:·
and exclusive access from their respective residences to the
highway located northerly therefrom.

(R.

1-9;

Ex. D-1)

The critical issues here presented are:
1.

constitute a

Does the taking of a private easement or right
"taking"

01

•

in the constitutional and statutory sci•·

and,

2.

Whether damages accrue to the portion of the pr·Jc'

remaining after the portion condemned has been taken.
It is clear under the Eminent Domain statutes
that a private easement or right-of-way,

as well as. fee

-7-

1,1 '1'1 111av be taken for a public use under appropriate circumstances.
11tle §78-34-2, U.C.A.,

(1953 as amended).

ritle §78-34-10, U.C.A.,

(1953 as amended),

provides, in

tl1at in determining the amount of compensation and damages to
1ded in an eminent domain proceeding, the Court or jury must
,"

, !:cc legal evidence and ascertain and assess:

* *(l) The value of the property sought to be
rondemned and all improvements thereon appertaining
to the realty, and of each and every separate estate
or interest therein; and if it consists of different
parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate
or interest therein shall be separately assessed."
"(2)
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned and the construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
Plaintiff.

* *

-1i:

11

On the issue of whether or not a private easement or rightof-VJay constitutes such an estate in property as to give rise to a
r:aim for damages when taken in eminent domain proceedings, it has
generally been recognized that such an estate in real estate does
in

fact constitute a "property interest" in the constitutional

sense and must be compensated for when taken under the exercise of
eminent domain.
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 2,
Section 5.14,

it is stated:

"It is well settled that a private easement in real
estate is property in the constitutional sense, and
may be taken via exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
* * * An easement is an interest in land,
and it is taken in the constitutional sense when
the land over which it is exercised is taken; * * *"
"vvhen the servient tenement is the subject of a
rondemnation proceeding judicial in character it

-8-

has been held that the owner of the dominant
* -r, -,', ,,
tenement is a necessary party.
See:

STATE OF ARIZONA v.

THELBERG,

STATE OF ARIZONA v. WILSON,
BRINTON, 41 Idaho 317;

420 P.2d 992,

239 P.

In the instant case,

350 P.2d 988,
(Ariz.

(Ariz.

1·r

l'lhhi,

738.
it is undisputed that the Defer··.··

John D'Ambrosia and Mable D'Ambrosia not only utilized the 5 ,~c
"Parcel 69:A" as a right-of-way,
simple of 88. 92%,

but were in fact the owners

subject, however,

to the rights of the othec

Defendants as users thereof as an easement and right-of -v1ay ':
their respective properties and that such right-of-way v1as p•r,
in nature.

(R.

1-9, 80-98)

This Court has consistently held that owners of prope··
which abutt an established public street and have an easement
access thereto are entitled to be compensated when such acces•.
substantially impaired or destroyed through the exercise of"
domain power.
9 Utah 31,
464;

See:

33 P.

DOOLY BLOCK v. SALT LAKE RAPID TRANSIT Cr.

229;

120 P.2d 276;

STATE ROAD COMMISSION v.

ROSELLE, 101

STATE ROAD COMMISSION v. HANSEN,

14 Utah''

383 P.2d 917; Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volur•.
Section 6.36.
In the case of City of Lewis ton v. Brinton, supra, a
similar fact situation was involved,

and the Supreme Court of·

held:
"Whether the rights of the easement owners were
interfered with or impaired in any manner v1as a
question of fact only determinable if they were
parties, furthermore, under C. S. §7414, it rnust_
be determined whether damages accrue to the
portion of the property remaining to the owner
after the portion condemned has been taken.
Appellant herein owned buildings adjacent to the
proposed alley, and consequently, if the tenants

-9-

were affected by the change in the thoroughfare,
he would be affected, and, furthermore, those who
claimed easements might be vitally affected by
the changed use resulting from the establishment
of the proposed alley.
These easement claimants
should therefore have been made parties.
c. s.
§ 7 410.
'' '' *" (Emphasis added)
"'' '' ''in view of C. S. §7414, the jury should have
been instructed on damages which might accrue to
the remaining portion of appellant's property not
sought to be condemned.
* * *" (Emphasis added)
It has generally been recognized that when property has
heen injuriously affected or has sustained a special or peculiar
dArnage as a result of the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
compensation is required especially where there has been some
physical disturbance of a right which an owner of his parcel of
land has enjoyed in connection with his property which gives it
additional value.

See:

Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition,

Volume 2, Section 6.27 (3); BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LOGAN CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT v. CROFT, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697; CUTLER v. CITY OF
BOSTON, 86 N.E. 798; WEBSTER v. CITY OF LOWELL, 8 N.E. 54; STATE

ex Rel. STATE HIGHWAY v. ZAHN, 633 S.W.2d 185; WILSON v. KANSAS
CITY, 162 S.W.2d 803.
The ownership of "Parcel 69:A", and the ownership of the
respective,

individually owned residential tracts, bear a

relationship to one another, which even though not in common
ownership in the same quantity, nevertheless sustains the defendant
landowners' claim to severance damages by reason of the taking of
the easement servicing the individually owned properties.
It has generally been recognized by the weight of authority
that severance damages are generally allowed where there is a unity
ot title between two tracts, even though the quantity or quality of
the title or estate in the tracts differ.

See:

ex Rel. SYMMS v.

-10-

NELSON SAND AND GRAVEL,

I NC. , 468 P. 2d 306; CITY OF LOS

WOLFE, 491 P.2d 813; HEMMERLING v.

TOMLEU,

INC.,

Ai!!;E'.c

4)2 P.2d ,,

Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume 4, Sc•·t 101
In the Symms case, supra,

the Court noted:

"'' ''
accordingly, ·we chose to full
line of authority which allows severance rlArnA1
where there is unity of title between two tra••,,
even though the quantity or quality of the ti"lP
or estate in the two tracts differ.
In the case of BOXBERGER v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISST,
P.2d 920,

(Colo.

I'

1953), the State Highway Commission conde"'''"

private access, and in addressing the issue of severance
be awarded in that case,

·J""• _

the Supreme Court of Colorado n0te·i

"* * *It would seem difficult to establish the
true or market value of access rights since they
are not a commodity dealt in on a buying and
selling market; however, the right of ingress and
egress to and from a person's property adds or
detracts from the property value and it would
seem that the true value of such rights could
only be found in the difference between the value
of the land and its use for any and all kinds of
purposes before the disturbance or destruction of
such rights, and the value of the land minus any
access or disturbed or inconvenient access to the
highway. * * ''"
Where the parcel actually condemned in this case
constituted a private right-of-way which afforded the means
ingress and egress to the individually owned residential
is our contention that even though the landowners did not
possess the entire fee simple estate in said right-of-wa;,
nevertheless, was such an integral part of their
as to constitute each a separate and total unit.

respect1~

·

The test •:

applied in determining whether or not there exists a s1nal
land, seems to be the requirement that there be such

rt

or relation of adaptation, convenience, and use as to mJkf

-11-

rondemned tract reasonable and substantially necessary to the
·111c•yment of the remaining parcel or parcels.
1.1f,P/\ll<~,

CITY OF STOCKTON v.

31 P.2d 467.
In 29(A) C.J.S., Section 140, Page 591, it is there stated:
",.,
*There is no single rule or principle
established for determining the unity of lands
for the purpose of awarding damages in eminent
domain cases.
While, generally, there must be
unity of title, contiguity of use, and unity of
use, under certain circumstances, the presence
of unities is not essential unless unity of use
is given greatest emphasis, it has been called
the controlling and determining factor.
It has
been said that in order to constitute a unity of
property within the rule, there must be such a
connection or relationship of adaptation,
convenience, and actual and permanent use as to
make the enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably
and substantially necessary to the enjoyment of
the parcels left, in the most advantageous and
profitable manner in the business for which they
are used.
* * *"
In the case of STATE OF UTAH, by and through its road

comm1ss1on, v. HOOPER, 469 P.2d 1019, 25 Utah 2d 249, a similar
case was presented.

In that action, the defendant landowner owned

a strip of land 1630 ft.

long by 33 ft.

in width, upon which it had

constructed a canal and service roadway.

The condemning authority

constructed a freeway over and across a portion of the strip of
land aforesaid, and in so doing, effectively destroyed it for
vehicular traffic.
In that case, as in the instant case, the trial court
failed to award or recognize the existence of severance damages,
and the Supreme Court held that such ruling of the trial court was
rev~rs1ble
~mount

error and remanded the case for a determination on the

of severance damages to be awarded.
Another case which we believe to be highly probative of the

issue herein,

is that of BABINEC v. STATE, 512 P.2d 563,

(Alaska

-12-

1973) .

In that case,

condemnation

the ownership of the lands afferted 0,1

consisted

,,

of an ownership in fee s1mplP, toju··•

with a leasehold interest, and thP Supreme C0urt nf A 1 ''·v·,
addressing itself to the issuP Gf severance damrlgP-,
"(1,2)
Turning first to the question of sever-iroc
damages, a property owner is entitled to such
damages if it is determinPd that the property
taken is part of a larger parcel which has be0n
adversely affected by the taking.
The principol
test utilized for defining the "larger parcel" for
severance damage purposes is often ref erred to as
the "three unities" theory.
According to this
doctrine, three factors are employed in
ascertaining whether property in which the takP
occurs constitutes a single larger parcel.
ThP
factors are:
physical contiguity between the
several parcels, unity of ownership, and unity~!
use.
Where the various units of property are
physically contiguous with others, owned by the
same party or parties, and used for the same
purpose, the property is said to comprise one
single parcel of land."

" ( 3)
While the "three uni ties" theory is helpf1;l
in ascertaining the "larger parcel" to be
considered for severance damage controlling, we
do not hold that the theory is controlling.
If
competent evidence is presented indicating that
by reason of condemnation of a portion of his
property, remaining property owned by the propert\
owner is diminished in value, the issue of
severance damages should be presented to the
jury, regardless of whether slavish adherence to
the "three unities" theory might lead to a
contrary result.
In the case at bar the parties
had no substantial argument with reference to the
entire 65-acre Babinec ownership constituting one
"larger parcel" for the purpose of ascertaining
severance damages.
•'• '' '')
CONCLUSION
The two parcels of land here involved, constitute
individual residential lots upon which the respective Defrn·i•·
reside v1ith each lot having,

as an integral part thereof,•"''

established private right-of-way and access extending nort~'
the public highway system.

It is this private access and n0:'

-13-

,,,,,'/ that has been condemned and taken in fee by the Plaintiff, and
rl1t>rcby

gives rise to the claim and contention on the part of the

sa•rl landowners that their remaining tracts have sustained
-~v~r~nce

damages.

we believe that the authorities cited above adequately
sustain the defendant landowners claim that their respective,
individual residential homes, together with the right-of-way
extending to the highway system, constituted a single integral unit
of property and that when the access of said property was taken and
condemned for highway development, the remaining tracts sustained
a diminution in value and that a jury question was presented
relative to the amount of severance damages sustained by the
respective landowners.
It is, therefore, their claim and contention that when the
trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that severance damages
could not be awarded under the circumstances here involved, such
ruling deprived the respective landowners of the right to assert
their claim to an award of just compensation and damages pursuant
to constitutional and statutory rights.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

NT H. WALL &
AN V. LITIZZETTE
Attorneys for Appellants
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